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Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis
Frank Partnoy*

Introduction
A primary cause of the recent credit market turmoil was overdependence on credit
ratings and credit rating agencies. Without such overdependence, the complex financial
instruments, particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured
investment vehicles (SIVs), which were at the center of the crisis could not, and would
not, have been created or sold. Long-term sustainable policy measures should take into
account both regulatory and behavioral overdependence on ratings.
In the first part of the paper, I describe how over time credit rating agencies1
ceased to play the role of information intermediaries. By the time market participants
recently began to securitize large amounts of subprime mortgages, rating agencies were
available, not to provide information about the risk associated with the securitized
instruments, but to facilitate the use of “regulatory licenses”2 by enabling structurers to
create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings.
This role went well beyond the standard reputational model of the role of rating agencies.
In the second part of the paper, I suggest how future policy might minimize
overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licenses and by implementing
*

George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego School of Law.
By credit rating agencies, I am referring to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations (NRSROs), as that term was defined during the early 2000s, and in particular to the
two major NRSROs, Moody’s Investor Service and Standard & Poor’s Rating Services.
2
By regulatory license, I mean the property rights associated with the ability of a private entity,
rather than a regulator, to determine the substantive effect of legal rules. See Partnoy, Frank,
1999, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating
Agencies,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 77, pp. 619-712, at 622.
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“shock therapy” mechanisms to wean investors off ratings mnemonics. I also analyze
how regulators and market participants can learn from the flaws in rating agency models,
to avoid repeating similar mistakes. In particular, I focus on the misapplication of
historical data with respect to estimates of expected default probability, recovery, and
correlation. Finally, I assess how market measures of these estimates, based on actual
prices of traded assets, might substitute for credit ratings for both regulatory and
behavioral purposes.
Some background and theory: reputation vs. regulatory licenses
Historically, information intermediaries have arisen because of information
asymmetry between buyers and sellers, particularly in markets where sellers have
superior information but cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers.3 If buyers
are economically rational, prices in a market with information asymmetry will reflect the
average quality of a product, and sellers with superior products will bear the cost of the
information asymmetry. Consequently, sellers in such a market will have an incentive to
disclose the superior nature of their product so that they can receive the highest price. In
financial markets, to the extent sellers cannot credibly make such disclosures, there are
incentives for information intermediaries to play this role.
Information-gathering firms that certify asset quality typically must satisfy three
criteria before their certification will be credible to outside investors. First, the certifying
agent must have reputational capital at stake in the certification activity. In other words,
the certifying agent credibly must be able to pledge that it will suffer a loss, related either
to litigation or declining reputation, if its certification is systematically biased or false.
Second, this expected loss must exceed the expected gain from false certification. Third,
3

Partnoy, 1999, at 633-36.
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the agent’s services must be costly and the cost must be related to the informational
asymmetry between buyer and seller.
In the early debt markets, credit rating agencies evolved to play an informational
intermediary role, from the nineteenth century mercantile credit rating agencies through
John Moody’s application to bonds.4 Moody’s insight was that he could profit by selling
to the public a synthesis of complex bond data into a single letter rating.
For the most part, credit rating agencies fit this reputational investor-pay model
until the mid-1970s, when, not coincidentally, the Securities and Exchange Commission
began relying substantively on credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes and the
agencies shifted to an issuer-pay model.5 As the regulatory dependence on ratings
increased, rating agencies became more profitable and also began providing ratings of
transactions designed to achieve particular ratings. During the late 1980s and early
1990s, bankers and issuers created a range of highly-rated asset-backed transactions and
collateralized bond obligations, as well as derivative product companies, financial
guarantor transactions, and AAA-rated arbitrage vehicles. The first SIVs and assetbacked CDOs were created during this period.
As the credit rating agency model shifted from investor-pay to issuer-pay, the
conditions necessary for the existence of a well-function information intermediary

4

Partnoy, 1999, at 637-38.
More precisely, the regulatory dependence on credit ratings began in 1973, when the SEC
proposed amending broker-dealer “haircut” requirements, which set forth the percentage of a
financial asset's market value a broker-dealer was required to deduct for the purpose of
calculating its net capital requirement. Rule 15c3-1, promulgated two years later, required a
different "haircut" based on the credit ratings assigned by Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations (NRSROs). See 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1. Since the mid-1970s, statutes and
regulations increasingly have come to depend explicitly on NRSRO ratings. See Partnoy, 1999,
at 690-703.
5
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faltered. The rating agencies faced little or no risk of loss from inaccurate ratings, while
the potential gains from inaccurate ratings increased. Ratings substantially lagged the
revelation of public information about rated issuers and instruments, and rating agencies
repeatedly were forced to revise ratings substantially downward. As rating agencies
began rating substantially greater numbers of issuers and instruments, the resources
expended per rating necessarily declined, and the cost of providing a rating became
disconnected from the information gap between investors and issuers. Finally, the rating
agencies’ businesses became progressively more profitable, even as the informational
value of their ratings declined.
During the 1990s, overdependence on credit ratings led many market participants
to create highly-rated fixed income instruments that carried attractive yields relative to
comparable assets, but that also carried new risks typically not associated with highlyrated bonds. The bond market crisis in 1994-95 was driven by structured notes and other
derivatives transactions, including mortgage-backed transactions, which were designed to
achieve high ratings, even though they carried other embedded risks. More recently,
overdependence on credit ratings played a significant role in the collapse of Enron.6
With respect to mortgages, “first-level” securitizations were a response to the
investment grade “cliff” noted by W. Braddock Hickman,7 and later Michael Milken,

6

The following assessment from Senator Joseph Lieberman, whose Senate committee held the
first hearings on Enron, was typical: “The credit-rating agencies were dismally lax in their
coverage of Enron. They didn’t ask probing questions and generally accepted at face value
whatever Enron’s officials chose to tell them. And while they claim to rely primarily on public
filings with the SEC, analysts from Standard and Poor’s not only did not read Enron’s proxy
statement, they didn’t even know what information it might contain.” Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, press release, “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector
Watchdogs” (October 8, 2002).
7
See Hickman, W. Braddock, 1958, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
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who saw that portfolios of sub-investment grade rated bonds outperformed more highlyrated bonds on a risk adjusted basis. Market participants adapted this insight to
mortgages of various types, which could be pooled into new highly-rated fixed income
instruments. Surprisingly, this “cliff” persisted over time, in both corporate bond and
mortgage markets; the large yield discontinuity between investment grade and belowinvestment grade ratings did not disappear even after large amounts of securities were
issued. To the contrary, in the early 2000s, rating agency models, and assumptions about
historical default, recovery, and correlation, suggested that extant mortgage-backed
securities could be repackaged and resold in ways that would outperform, not only the
mortgage-backed securities themselves, but other comparably rated securities.
The growth of “second-level” mortgage securitization
As the credit derivatives market was experiencing record growth, fixed income
structurers and investors, with the assistance of credit rating agencies, searched for assets
that could be securitized to create highly-rated fixed income instruments with attractive
yields relative to comparable investments. For the first time, banks began seriously
considering “second-level” securitizations of “first-level” mortgage-backed securities
(which were securitizations of mortgages).
The fundamental economic rationale for “second-level” securitizations is not
obvious. After all, the underlying mortgage assets already have been securitized. Indeed,
the mortgage-backed securities market was already a deep market, driven by high
demand from both originators and investors. Mortgage-backed securities were issued in
a competitive environment in large numbers, and already were rated by the rating
agencies. “First-level” securitization transactions were a response to gaps and

5
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 288 [2009]

inefficiencies in the underlying market for individual assets. To the extent mortgages
were being allocated or bundled inefficiently, or not in ways investors desired, one might
have expected that continuous “first-level” securitization would evolve to ameliorate
these inefficiencies. Put another way, if there had been a more efficient way of pooling
mortgages, or a pocket of unsatisfied demand for particular pool portfolios or structures,
investors likely would have demanded it, and then banks would have created and
supplied it.
Yet the proliferation of “second-level” mortgage-backed CDOs and SIVs
suggested that billions of dollars of “first-level” mortgage-backed securities appeared to
be mispriced. Market participants could pool those securities into new special purpose
entities with tranched capital structures, and sell the slices of those structures for more
than the value of the underlying mortgage-backed securities. These transactions, too,
persisted over time, so much so that the appetite for “second-level” mortgage
securitizations drove financial intermediaries both to originate new and increasingly risky
mortgages, and to create synthetic exposure to mortgages, which then could be
resecuritized through tranched special purpose entities, again at higher prices than the
underlying mortgage-backed securities were trading in the market.
To obtain ratings for “second-level” mortgage securitizations, both the structurers
and the rating agencies used models based on earlier corporate bond-backed transactions,
which provided a methodology for labeling the risks associated with mortgage securitiesbacked transactions. Bankers increasingly sought to combine the underlying securities
and to stratify capital structures in ways that would create new investment grade-rated
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securities. In particular, CDOs and SIVs were designed to create large tranches of AAArated assets backed by lower-rated mortgage-backed securities.
Even after a mortgage-backed security had been re-securitized through cash-flow
based CDOs, market participants suggested that there was no reason why investors
couldn’t take on exposure to a particular mortgage-backed security more than once.
Arrangers created synthetic exposure based on side bets derived from the value of the
underlying mortgage-backed securities so that investors could obtain exposure to the
performance of a pool of mortgages without having an investment vehicle or special
purpose entity actually buy the mortgage-backed securities. Synthetic CDOs and SIVs
obtained exposure through derivatives transactions, most commonly credit default swaps.
Credit ratings as drivers of “second-level” securitizations
The linchpin of a CDO or a SIV backed in whole or part by synthetic assets was
the credit rating. Investors typically did not examine the underlying assets of a synthetic
CDO or SIV in any detail or at all. One might criticize them for not doing so, except that
the underlying assets frequently were not even specified when the deal was sold. Instead,
investors relied on parameters set by the arrangers, bankers, and rating agencies to
constrain the assets that could be purchased originally, and held over time.
If the credit rating agencies, and their clients, had used reasonable and accurate
models and assumptions, then in principle these transactions might not have been
problematic. However, these parties faced financial incentives to use unreasonable and
inaccurate assumptions and models to complete deals and thereby earn greater fees.
These incentives were especially strong given the expected absence of any reputational
consequence, particularly for individuals involved in transactions, who essentially could
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sell long-term options obligating their firms while pocketing shorter-term bonuses for
themselves. The way to obtain sufficiently attractive ratings to pay the high transaction
costs and fees for the various arranging parties, and still generate attractive yields for
purchasers was to use models and assumptions that did not reflect the actual risk of the
underlying mortgages, including risks that already were impounded in the price of those
securities in the market for mortgage-backed securities.8
The simplest way to generate unwarranted high ratings was to use outdated and
inapplicable historical assumptions with respect to the underlying mortgage-backed
securities. The inputs to the relevant models were straightforward: expected default rate,
recovery rate upon default, and, for portfolios of assets, the correlation of expected
defaults. The rating agencies created models, with the assistance of bankers and
arrangers, that generated tranche credit ratings for “second-level” deals based on these
inputs. Those models, in turn, typically depended on assumptions with respect to the
expected statistical distribution that returns on the underlying collateral would follow.
Given these assumptions and models, arrangers were then free to find collateral
that would generate the most attractive tranche yields, subject to ratings-based
constraints. The restrictions on collateral typically were based on credit ratings; in other
words, the “second-level” securitization methodology depended on previous “first-level”
securitization ratings. As the prices of mortgage-backed securities rose, along with
housing prices, it was difficult to generate “second-level” deals with highly-rated
tranches without using increasingly unreasonable assumptions. As collateral became
more expensive and ratings of that collateral lagged increasing market prices, accurate
8

Mason, Joseph R. and Joshua Rosner, 2007, “Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market
Disruptions,” SSRN Working Paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475, May 3, 2007.
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and timely ratings would have appeared lower than would have been warranted. This lag
provided a rationale for increasingly aggressive assumptions with respect to “secondlevel” deals.
Paradoxically, when housing prices began to fall, but ratings on “first-level”
securitizations did not, the historical ratings methodology made “second-level”
securitizations increasingly attractive. If one could buy AAA-rated mortgage-backed
securities that had fallen in price, but still use the same historical default, recovery, and
correlation assumptions associated with AAA ratings in the relevant model, one could
create a highly-rated, high-yielding set of “second-level” transactions. As long as
mortgage-backed securities ratings lagged market prices, as those prices declined, CDOs
and SIVs backed by that collateral would appear increasingly attractive.
Rating agency assumptions and models did not accurately capture the risk
associated with “second-level” securitizations.9 Default rate assumptions were derived
from historical information, including default data about other asset categories as well as
asset price correlations, rather than default correlations. Moreover, assumptions for
“second-level” deals were based on ratings of mortgage-backed securities, even when
both the rating agencies and other participants in the resecuritization transactions were
aware that both that the credit quality of the underlying mortgages had declined and that
the expected default correlations associated with those mortgages had increased.

9

The SEC investigation of the credit rating agencies found that the struggled to adapt to the
complexity of mortgage-backed structured finance deals. See Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2008, “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” July, at 12 (“One analyst expressed concern that
her firm’s model did not capture ‘half’ of the deal’s risk, but that ‘it could be structured by cows
and we would rate it.’”). The SEC also found that “Rating agencies made ‘out of model’
adjustments and did not document the rationale for the adjustment.” Id. at 14.
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Nevertheless, the simulations the agencies ran to calculate tranche ratings were based on
stale and inaccurate assumptions.
Rating agency correlation assumptions were particularly important.10 Inaccurate
correlation assumptions based on incorrect statistical models enabled parties to structure
deals with high ratings on senior tranches, given that the expected correlation of defaults
of mortgage-backed securities was higher than the estimates used for the models.11 The
rating agencies have struggled to understand the importance of correlation assumptions
for CDOs and SIVs, even as those assumptions supported a sharply increasing number of
“second-level” securitizations. Moody’s conducted an in-depth study of corporate bond
correlation, which led to a new Monte Carlo simulation-based market tool in 2004 for
measuring the credit risk of synthetic transactions; it revised its methodology for
structured finance asset correlations a year later.12 S&P’s inputs simply remained
constant for years.13 By 2006 and 2007 at the latest, it was apparent that the relevant
mortgage asset correlations underlying CDOs and SIVs were significantly higher than the
rating agencies had assumed. By February 2008, Moody’s had downgraded at least one
tranche of 94.2% of subprime residential mortgage-backed deals it had rated in 2006.14

10

See Hull, John, and Alan White, 2006, “Valuing Credit Derivatives Using An Implied Copula
Approach,” Journal of Derivatives, Winter; van Deventer, Donald R., CDOs and the Credit
Crisis: Complexity and Model Risk in the Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Are Severe,
2008, Bank Accounting and Finance, June, at 7 (“Management has often discovered that the
working-level staff has been depending heavily on models, like the copula approach, that were
known or should have been known to be wrong.”).
11
Moody’s Investors Service, 2006, “Moody’s Modeling Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Cash Flow CDO Transactions,” September, at 10.
12
See Moody’s Investors Service, 2005, “Collateralised Debt Obligations: A Moody’s Primer,”
March, at 5-6; Moody’s Investors Service, 2005, “Moody’s Revisits its Assumptions Regarding
Structured Finance Default (and Asset ) Correlations for CDOs,” June.
13
See Partnoy, Frank, 2006, “How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers,” in Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? (Yasuyuki Fuchita and
Robert E. Litan, eds.).
14
See Moody’s Investors Service, 2008, “A Short Guide to Subprime,” March, at 3.
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In sum, the proliferation of “second-level” securitization transactions is consistent
with substantial overdependence on credit ratings. If ratings had been accurate, or put
another way if investors had relied on ratings only to the extent they were accurate, then
there would have been little incentive for “second-level” securitizations. But because
investors were willing to buy CDO and SIV tranches simply because of their high ratings
and high yields, either because of regulatory reliance on ratings or because the mnemonic
device of ratings came to play an overly-important private role, CDO and SIV tranches
had higher-than-justified ratings, even though they held collateral that already had been
securitized. Without overreliance on ratings, investors more likely would have looked
through the complexity of CDO and SIV transactions to the underlying mortgage-backed
securities, and prices more accurately would have reflected market estimates of default
probability, recovery, and correlation.
Regulatory vs. behavioral overdependence
To what extent was overdependence on ratings driven by regulation? I previously
have argued that rating agencies increasingly sell “regulatory licenses” rather than
information, and that ratings are not “opinions,” but instead are keys that unlock the
financial markets for regulated entities.15 Regulators recently have endorsed this
explanation, and the SEC has proposed rules to eliminate certain aspects of regulatory
dependence on ratings.16
In addition, it is apparent that, even putting aside regulatory influences, at least
some market participants independently over rely on ratings. At its core, this

15

Partnoy, 1999.
See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release Nos. IC-28327, IA-2751, File No. S7-1908.
16
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overreliance likely derives from decades of regulatory dependence on ratings, but it has
become a more widespread, behavioral phenomenon. Ratings are part of financial
culture. Even after the massive dislocation associated with the recent crisis, and the
abysmal performance of the rating agencies, market participants have continued to rely
on letter ratings. One conclusion is that even if all explicit references to ratings were
removed from regulation, some residual implicit overreliance would remain.
An interesting perspective on this behavioral point arises from the fact that the
major banks selling “second-level” securitizations also misperceived the risks associated
with the highest-rated tranches. Indeed, it appears that bank officers were so confident
about the high ratings of super-senior CDO tranches that they concluded that such
tranches posed virtually no risk. One reason, if not the primary reason, why they
misperceived such risks was overreliance on credit rating agency assumptions and
models. Some of this overreliance derived from bank regulations that depend on credit
ratings; the rest was cultural.
Most strikingly, sanguine assessments of super-senior risk, and assumptions that
senior tranches protected by AAA-rated junior tranches could not default, appeared to be
so obviously correct that banks’ exposure to these tranches apparently remained hidden
from senior managers, investors, and regulators. No bank publicly disclosed risks
associated with super-senior tranches before the crisis began. Bank directors and officers
claimed, perhaps falsely, that they were unaware of risks associated with these tranches.
Moreover, many regulators apparently were unaware of the exposure as well. The Bank
of England, in its Financial Stability Report, noted that banks were net buyers of credit
protection in 2006; that estimate apparently did not reflect the large amounts of notional
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credit protection sold by banks in super-senior transactions.17 These estimates are set
forth in Chart 1 below.
Chart 1 – Outstanding Global Amounts of Credit Protection Bought By Institutions

Sources: BBA and Bank calculations.
(a) Amounts netted across long and short positions.

Much of the blame for overdependence on ratings can be placed on regulation,
and I set forth below some measures designed to eliminate this overdependence. But
market participants also independently over relied on ratings. High ratings replaced
independent judgment, particularly when “second-level” transactions created the illusion
of thick bands of highly-rated protective tranches. The collapse of senior securities of
both CDOs and SIVs illustrates that “second-level” securitizations require an analysis of
something more than just tranche ratings. Because these instruments are so much more
complex than the underlying “first-level” securitizations, they generate a greater need for
investigation, and paradoxically are more amenable to overreliance on ratings.

17

Bank of England, 2008, “Financial Stability Report,” April, Chart 2.17. The Bank for
International Settlements had been warning about overreliance on ratings since early 2005. See
Committee on the Global Financial System, Bank for International Settlements, 2005, “The Role
of Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implications,” January.
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Some policy prescriptions
If the story about overreliance on credit ratings is even partially correct, what is to
be done? There are two categories of policy responses, some of which already have been
proposed. First, regulators should eliminate explicit reliance on credit ratings. To the
extent regulators are concerned that such an approach would leave a substantive void,
there are many substitutes for ratings, including market measures of risk, as described
below. Second, regulators should implement some form of “shock therapy” to jar market
participants from overreliance on ratings. The use of mnemonics is highly path
dependent, and unless there are strong reasons for participants to switch, they will not.
With respect to the first point, the SEC already has proposed removing references
to NRSROs in its own rules. For example, Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act
limits a money market fund’s portfolio investments to securities that have received credit
ratings from NRSROs in one of the two highest short-term rating categories.18 The SEC
recommended replacing this NRSRO “regulatory license” with a requirement that money
market fund boards of directors determine “that each portfolio instrument presents
minimal credit risks.”19 Likewise, other SEC proposals would replace several other rules
that depend explicitly on NRSRO ratings.
Notwithstanding the intense lobbying effort against these proposals, the SEC
should implement them as final. Moreover, other regulatory bodies should similarly
excise references to credit ratings. In the United States, the most efficient mechanism for
doing this would be for Congress formally to remove references from statutes, and then

18

See Investment Company Act, Rule 2a-7(a)(10), (21).
See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, References to Ratings of Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release Nos. IC-28327, at 8.
19
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to hold hearings to encourage various agencies to remove any additional remaining
references in both formal rules and informal policies.
Perhaps the most important regulatory references to ratings are in international
banking regulations, particularly under the Basel II agreement of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. Basel II explicitly allows banking regulators to permit banks to use
credit ratings from approved rating agencies in calculating their net capital reserve
requirements. International regulators should remove this provision, and in place of letter
ratings substitute market-based measures, such as credit spreads or credit default swap
prices, and/or discretionary estimates of default probability, expected recovery, and
correlation. The Bank for International Settlements has long been a leader in publicizing
problems associated with the use of ratings in structured finance.20 It now should
explicitly disclaim the use of ratings in regulation generally.
Ratings and rating agencies also have been subsidized by other forms of
regulation, and those subsidies should be removed as well. NRSROs are specifically
exempt under U.S. securities law from Section 11 liability and Regulation FD; they
should not be. Nor should rating agencies be exempt from liability for statutory and
common law private claims based on any freedom of speech or journalistic privilege
rationales. Historically, the rating agencies have interposed First Amendment objections
in civil litigation, with some success.21 As new cases based on “second-level”
securitizations arise, judges should distinguish those prior cases, and make it clear that
rating agencies are subject to civil liability and are not protected by any First Amendment

20
21

See Bank for International Settlements, 2005.
See Partnoy, 2006.
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privilege. Legislators also should consider clarifying the viability of private rights of
action against rating agencies.
The rating agencies’ position that ratings are merely “opinions,” and therefore are
entitled to the same protection as other “speakers,” is specious in the context of complex
securitization transactions. Ratings of “second-level” securitizations are not protected
speech, and rating agencies are doing much more than merely speaking. They have a
high level of initial and ongoing involvement in these deals, at early and later stages, and
receive significantly higher fees for them. Rating agencies determine the capital cushions
that are required for particular tranches; they provide capital matrix parameters that
govern the operation of special purpose entity issuers; they are involved in the operation
of the issuers on an ongoing basis; they instruct the asset manager regarding the kinds of
assets the issuers can acquire, both initially and over time; and the deal documentation for
these transactions typically includes descriptions of the simulation models the rating
agencies use to determine the relative proportions of an entity’s capital structure, as well
as the necessarily over-collateralization ratios and triggers, both initially and over time.
Moreover, unlike corporate bond transactions, CDOs and SIVs require a much more in
depth analysis by the rating agencies, including the use of their mathematical models and
assumptions. For these reasons, judges should reject the claim that ratings of “secondlevel” securitizations are merely “opinions.”
With respect to second point regarding “shock therapy,” regulators should
encourage investors not to apply the same ratings and analysis to corporate bonds versus

16
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structured finance assets.22 Ratings of these instruments are categorically different, and it
was and is a mistake for anyone to use the same mnemonic for each category. A highlyrated CDO does not pose the same risks as other highly-rated securities, including the
collateral underlying the CDO. To the extent regulators and investors continue to rely on
ratings, which they should not, at minimum their rating-based rules should distinguish
between the symbology of corporate bonds and structured finance instruments, if not
other categories as well. Ideally, regulators and investors should find independent means
of assessing the risks of different investments within different categories. Forcing
investors to split ratings among categories should lead private actors to reassess their
approach to risk.
Disclosure with respect to credit derivatives and credit rating-based transactions
also must improve. Current disclosure of notional amounts and value-at-risk (VAR) does
not enable investors to assess the risks associated with default, expected recovery, and
correlation of fixed income exposure. One reason for the recent collapse of major
financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG
was the lack of transparency with respect to “second-level” securitizations. When no one
has enough information to evaluate the risk of portfolios held by financial institutions, the
valuation of their issued securities becomes at best a guess. At minimum, bank regulators
should require that financial institutions disclose to examiners not only VAR-related
measures, but also more robust worst-case analyses and stress tests based on a wide range
of assumptions about expected default, recovery, and correlation. Requiring such
disclosures also would encourage market participants to rely on these measures directly,
22

The SEC has proposed such a split. See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, Proposed
Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-57967, File
No. S7-13-08, June.
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instead of letter ratings. It also would encourage dissemination of risk disclosure to bank
officers and directors.
As regulators and investors seek substitutes for credit ratings, they should
consider looking to market measures and prices. Notwithstanding recent market
volatility and dislocations, market prices provided a far more accurate assessment of risk
than credit ratings. Such prices and related market measures are available from true
information intermediaries, which now play a modern version of the role John Moody
originally envisioned in the early twentieth century: providing valuable information about
credit risk. Most prominently, Markit Group Limited provides credit default swap
pricing and other data that investors could use to assess the risk of their portfolios over
time. It would vastly improve policy and market efficiency if regulators and investors
relied on this kind of data instead of credit ratings.
An example based on data from Markit is set forth in Chart 2 below. The chart
depicts the daily 5-year Bear Stearns senior credit default swap closing spreads, along
with a 30- and 90-day rolling average of these spreads. Note that the credit ratings
applicable to Bear Stearns’s senior debt were constant at single-A throughout this period.
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Chart 2 – Bear Stearns 5-Year CDS Market Spreads (bp) (Source: Markit)
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To the extent regulators or institutions are concerned about the volatility of
market based measures, it would be straightforward to reference a rolling average like
one of those depicted above. Reliance on market measures instead of credit ratings likely
would have led institutions with exposure to Bear Stearns securities to assess their
exposure more closely during the period leading up to that firm’s collapse. Instead of
regulating and making investment decisions based on a Bear Stearns credit rating that
remained unjustifiably high and unchanged during that bank’s crisis and collapse,
regulators and institutions instead could have looked to a rolling average of market
measures. Credit default swap spreads provided an early warning to market participants
regarding Bear Stearns.
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Moreover, the use of market measures would have beneficial ex ante effects,
particularly if regulators also adopt the heightened disclosure requirements outlined
above. For example, if Bear Stearns officials had known both that their firm would not
be rescued and that investors would sell their securities in response to a rapid
deterioration in prices, they would have been forced to be more proactive about
disclosing risks in advance, particularly with respect to “second-level” securitizations,
and perhaps as a result bank employees would not have taken on the key risks that led to
the bank’s collapse.
Not every regulator or market participant would need to rely on market measures
as a substitute for ratings. Some could rely on professional judgment, as the SEC has
suggested in its proposed Rule 2a-7 amendments. Others could rely on third-party
information providers. Some might continue to rely on Moody’s and S&P, although the
overwhelming evidence suggest that such reliance would be misguided. In any event, a
shift to permitting reliance on market-based measures would help discourage overreliance
on letter ratings.
Switching to market-based measures is not a radical concept. Indeed, even the
credit rating agencies themselves increasingly use market-based measures. Letter ratings
essentially have become shorthand labels based on assumptions about key variables:
probability of default, expected recovery in the event of default, and correlation.
Internally, the rating agencies generate letter ratings based on estimates of these
variables.23 At minimum, regulators and market participants should switch to relying on

23

With respect to mortgage-backed securities, prepayment risk also is a relevant variable.
Prepayment risk was an important factor during the 1994-95 interest rate crisis, but did not play a
major role during the recent sub-prime crisis.
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actual estimates of these variables instead of letter ratings that amalgamate the variables
in an opaque, outdated, and incomprehensible fashion.
Conclusion
Causation is a complex concept. It has both “but for” and “proximate” elements.
As a matter of “but for” causation, there is a strong argument that credit ratings and credit
rating agencies caused the crisis. “Second-level” mortgage-backed securitizations,
particularly CDOs and SIVs, explicitly depended on rating agency letter ratings. Without
those ratings, the transactions could not, and would not, have happened. Without the
ability to obtain high ratings for CDO and SIV tranches, there would have been little
appetite for overpriced lower-rated mortgage collateral. Without that appetite, there
would have been little pressure leading to the proliferation of sub-prime mortgages,
because those mortgages could not have been offloaded through “second-level”
securitizations. Without the proliferation of low quality mortgages, there would not have
been a dramatic housing market rise and fall, with the attendant ripple effects.
It is more difficult to say whether credit ratings were a “proximate” cause of the
crisis, but there are strong arguments here as well. Overreliance on ratings led banks to
hold super-senior exposure they otherwise would have assessed more carefully.
Overreliance on ratings led regulators to misperceive the extent to which speculation on
sub-prime mortgages had spread, or to where. Overreliance on ratings led institutional
investors to take on hidden correlation bets, which their directors, officers, and
shareholders did not understand.
Overreliance on ratings was a central component of the credit crisis. In
responding to the crisis, and in planning and implementing reforms, regulators should not
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focus exclusively on proposals related to lending abuses, bank rescues, credit expansion,
and macroeconomic or cyclical factors. They should not miss the crucial role of credit
ratings.
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